Skip to main content
This guide checks that a sealed Blockgence document has not changed and that Blockgence issued it. You need no account and no Blockgence code: only Python 3 and OpenSSL 3.
What you need
  • The document, as JSON (for example documento.json).
  • Python 3, with nothing else installed.
  • OpenSSL 3.0 or later. macOS’s /usr/bin/openssl is LibreSSL and cannot read Ed25519 keys: use the Homebrew one (brew install openssl@3).
  • Blockgence’s public key, saved as blockgence-evidencia.pub.pem.
1

Recompute the content fingerprint

Remove manifest.integrity, sort the keys, serialize with no spaces in UTF-8 and apply sha256:
It must match manifest.integrity.digest. If it does not, the document changed and there is no point going further.
2

Build the signed message

The message is the text blockgence-integrity-v1:sha256: followed by the fingerprint you computed in step 1. Always use the recomputed fingerprint, never the one the document carries.
3

Extract the signature

The signature is the value field of manifest.integrity.attestations.signature, in base64:
4

Verify with the published key

Verify with the key downloaded from the public key page, not with the one the document carries:
It must answer Signature Verified Successfully. Since it is verified against the published key, a signature made with another key fails here.
5

Optional: compare the fingerprint of the document's key

Save the document’s public_key_pem as pub.pem. This must give the published key_id:
Compare the result with the hex in sha256:d8853d1c1b7322b8b7e3bab730fccd0652c0c97a825c3317b3bc705d650f5c5f.
Every document also carries the full recipe: the fingerprint one in manifest.integrity.recipe and the OpenSSL one for the signature in attestations.signature.verify_openssl (both in Spanish).

What each result means

What the signature proves and what it does not

That the document was issued by whoever holds Blockgence’s private key and has not changed since it was signed.
That is backed by the methodology, the sources and what the document itself declares it could not see.
manifest.generated_at is set by the system itself and is not certified by a third party. An upper bound comes from the timestamp, if the document has one.

Verify the timestamp

If the document carries attestations.timestamp, the fingerprint can be anchored in Bitcoin with the official OpenTimestamps client. The timestamp is off by default: many documents do not have one, and they say so in timestamp_note.
1

Download the complete proof

The proof inside the document is the pending one, because the document does not change after it is issued. Wait for the Bitcoin confirmation (a few hours) and download the complete proof from the complete_proof_url link, or from GET /v1/evidence/timestamp/{digest}.ots.
2

Verify with the official client

With the fingerprint recomputed in step 1 above:
It needs a Bitcoin node, even a pruned one.
3

Without a Bitcoin node

ots info <fingerprint>.ots shows the block and the Merkle root. Compare that root with the block header in any explorer. The proof starts at the fingerprint: ots info shows File sha256 hash: <fingerprint>.